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Chapter III
Anti-Platonism of Rorty’s thought
One can consider right at the beginning whether the so-called 
postmodern thought is anti-Platonic, or maybe it is just 
non-Platonic, that is to say, whether the thought in question is 
created in opposition to Plato, against him, or maybe it just omits 
certain questions that are viewed as foundational for philosophical 
thinking in general and that determine the course taken by 
reflection in the whole, as Rorty calls it, "Plato-Kant sequence". It 
might appear, and many commentators of recent cultural 
transformations do get such an impression, that philosophical 
postmodernism merely abandons traditional issues, abandons 
attempts at answering traditional questions as useless, fruitless, 
sterile or uninteresting. That is, in fact, the case with many 
questions and that is also what one can clearly see in 
postmodernists’ general declarations. But it is also the case that 
part of those problems ("perennial, eternal problems of 
philosophy", as Rorty calls them in the opening section of 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) haunt postmodernists and 
even if they do not attack classical answers to certain questions, 
they nevertheless question the meaningfulness or usefulness of 
questions themselves.
Is thus postmodern philosophy (and let me hasten to explain 
that I am using here the term for the sake of convenience, in an 
ambiguous, very broad sense, being aware that the word itself 
gradually ceases to mean much) "footnotes to Plato"?1 Sure it is,
1 Rorty tries not to use the word "postmodern" because it has been annexed 
(in the USA, not in Europe) by radical, ultraleftist -  and socially ineffective -  
literary theorists. The European meaning of the term is much broader, while in 
the USA it may be the case that its connotations are narrow and unambiguous: 
postmodern are "red-hot centers of political radicalism", as Rorty says, and 
"postmodernists" are "cynical outsiders" who not so much have abandoned 
rationality in favor of irrationality, not so much even politicize the universities 
within "political correctness" attitude, but rather have abandoned a certain idea 
dear to liberal intellectuals. The idea in question is "mobilizing moral outrage in
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I will attempt to show below specifically postmodern anti-Platonic 
themes in Rorty; I will try to show that some Platonic ideas are an 
extremely topical, negative point of reference, bringing about both 
epistemological, as well as ethical and cultural consequences.
1.
From the perspective of subsequent books and texts by Richard 
Rorty it can be clearly seen that to have a look at his anti-Platonism 
and anti-essentialism, it is not enough to read either only 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, or only Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity, Consequences of Pragmatism and both volumes 
of Philosophical Papers. I see as more and more illusory 
statements about some "Rorty to Philosophy..." and his 
"post-PMN-writings" (as some his Anglo-Saxon commentators call 
them). For me it turns out that the impression given by various 
readings of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in Reading Rorty 
-  the first serious collected volume devoted to the American 
pragmatist -  is totally misleading, or at least extremely one-sided. 
The book, it is claimed there, is merely criticism of traditional 
epistemology carried out on the grounds of American analytic 
philosophy not too interesting to a wider public (and, possibly, a 
loose project of philosophy as "conversation", some of them add). 
And yet it can only be seen retrospectively that the book provides 
most interesting philosophical "foundations" to later, often more 
metaphilosophical, literary and cultural ideas. To put it in a nutshell: 
one can find there the idea of solidarity and self-creation, there is 
the fundamental question about the place of philosophy in culture 
rather than merely that about the place of epistemology in 
philosophy; as well as there is a question about the future of the 
philosopher in culture, about mechanisms of production and 
collapse of his self-image, there is also the germ of the project of
defense of the weak, of drawing upon a moral vocabulary common to the 
well-educated and the badly educated, to those who get paid for analyzing 
symbols and those who get paid for pouring concrete or dishing up 
cheesburgers". Therefore Rorty on numerous occasions regretted having 
happened to use the term -  although he used it in a European, especially 
Lyotardian sense. See Richard Rorty, "Intellectuals in Politics: Too Far In? Too 
Far Out?", Dissent, Fall 1991 (a typescript, pp. 14, 20).
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the "post-Kantian culture", "philosophy without mirrors" and 
criticism of merely cognitive -  and derived from Plato -  paradigm 
of human activity (and from there there is only a step towards 
d iscussions of su ffering, pain, novels, redescrip tions, 
recontextualization, private/public etc. -  as a matter of fact, the 
whole "turn" seems to me to be a change of rhetoric to the one 
culturally better understood).
For our purposes here it will be necessary to present briefly the 
dichotomy between edifying (borrowed from Gadamer’s Bildung) 
and systematic philosophers, preceded by some general remarks 
on Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Let us say at the very 
beginning that the book is "therapeutic" (in the sense of the late 
Wittgenstein) rather than "constructive", thus it is unavoidably 
"parasitic", for it uses means worked out by e.g. Quine, Davidson, 
Kuhn and Putnam to ends deriving from Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and Dewey.2 The reason for which the book was written in the 
vocabulary of analytic philosophy is banal, contingent and -  as 
Rorty himself says -  "autobiographical". Owing to familiarity with 
this rather than that philosophy, the author can be parasitic on 
"constructive efforts of analytic philosophers". The purpose of the 
book is
To undermine the reader’s confidence in "the mind" as 
som eth ing  about which one should have a 
"philosophical" view, in "knowledge" as something about 
which there ought to be a "theory" and which has 
"foundations", and in "philosophy" as it has been 
conceived since Kant.3
Thus the reader looking in that book for a new theory about any 
of the aforementioned issues would be disappointed. Rorty 
presents in it a traditional, Kantian view of philosophy (as the 
so-called "epistemologically-centered philosophy") according to 
which it would be supposed to be "foundational" with respect to all 
other domains of culture, to "ground" claims to knowledge of other
2 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 7.
3 Ibidem, p. 7.
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disciplines of culture, in a word -  it would be suposed to be such 
a domain in which the central place is occupied by a general theory 
of representation, dividing up culture into the areas which 
"represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those 
which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing 
so)".4 The Kantian ideal of philosophy as a "tribunal of pure 
reason" was still strengthened by Russell and Husserl with their 
ideals of "scientific" and "exact" philosophy. Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature-treating Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy as "one 
more variant of Kantian philosophy", still constructing a 
"permanent, neutral framework for inquiry, and thus for all of 
culture" -  engages in a daring deconstruction of hegemony of 
analytic philosophers (and let us bear in mind that the book was 
published in 1979 and it was a long road to a wider acceptance of 
Continental theories of e.g. Derrida, Lyotard or even Foucault). 
Rorty puts forward the most serious reproach, uncontested as it 
cannot be contested -  namely the escapeof all these philosophies, 
from Plato to Kant to analytic philosophers, from history... Positive 
protagonists of the book are Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger 
(in their second, later incarnations) -  the philosophers who 
contributed to gradual setting free our philosophical beliefs from 
the picture of the mind as a great mirror that contains various, more 
or less adequate, representations. The ocular metaphorics was 
critic ized  by W ittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, 
Heidegger was supposed to provide us with historical awareness 
of its origins and Dewey was supposed to add a "social" 
perspective. It was them in Rorty’s view who made it possible to 
think of the "post-Kantian" culture in which there is no 
all-encompassing discipline providing legitimation or grounding all 
other disciplines; they rejected epistemology and metaphysics, 
ignored them instead o f -  in a traditional manner -  arguing against 
them... The se are the most general remarks to outline a 
background without which anti-Platonism in Rorty’s thought might 
remain incomprehensible.
Let us pass on now to the opposition of systematic and edifying 
philosophers that cuts across the whole history of philosophy and
4 Ibidem, p. 3.
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that is needed by Rorty, so at least it seems to me, for narrative 
reasons. The oppositions can be derived from a more original 
contrast between "edification" on the one hand and "truth" on the 
other; searching for truth is supposed by Rorty to be one of many 
ways of edifying, being on a par with various descriptions 
suggested by poets, novelists, anthropologists etc.5 "Discovering 
facts" -  "knowing" -  "search for truth" -  is just one from among 
many projects of possible edification. But how it would be in 
Western tradition, everyone knows: Greek thought determined for 
over two thousands years that knowing (with all visual metaphors 
accompanying it6) became privileged. Rorty says that
In every sufficiently reflective culture, there are those 
who single out some area, one set of practices, and see 
it as the paradigm human activity.... In the mainstream
5 See Richard Rorty, PMN, pp. 359-362
6 It is worth while reminding here of the criticism of "ocularcentrism" in 
French thought, of philosophically grounded disinclination to visual metaphors, 
of violent and broad criticism since Bataille (from The Story of the Eye) to Lyotard 
to Derrida to Baudrillard to Foucault. As "ocularcentrism" of the whole 
philosophical tradition is one of those "footnotes to Plato", all attempts at 
questioning it must be seen as anti-Platonic. Let us remind here briefly of that 
theme in Michel Foucault: it is present from scattered remarks in Madness in 
Civilization to e.g. "A Foreword to Transgression" to a culminating point in his 
analysis of visual techniques of power in Benthamian Panopticon in Discipline 
and Punish. Madness -  is a thing to "look at", an object of medical and political 
"observation” which under disciplining eye of power hid itself in an asylum 
opened in Classicism. Discipline and Punish shows the passage from 
"spectacles of power" -  from “the spectacle of the scaffold" to theatricality of the 
guillotine to the silence of death places, it also reveals an overwhelming power 
of le regard, the look, in Bentham’s project. To expose an individual to power, 
one no longer needs sophisticated methods, the look (or just the awareness of 
it) will suffice. If one adds to that desires for "anonymity" of that philosophe 
masque, then it will become clear that what was paralyzing to Foucault was an 
objectifying, alienating look of the Other. Linder his look it is indeed impossible 
to "transform oneself"-as he writes in Archeology of Knowledge-and  "escape 
from questions somewhere else", "not to be someone they think you are", and 
that is all important to the philosopher who writes in order "to have no face". See 
especially Martin Jay’s superb study Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision 
in Twentieth-Century French Thought, Chapter "From the Empire of the Gaze to 
the Society of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord" (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), previously published in a shorter version in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, ed. D. C. Hoy.
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of the Western philosophical tradition, this paradigm has 
been knowing -  possessing justified true beliefs, or, 
better yet, beliefs so intrinsically persuasive as to make 
justification unnecessary.7
Thus, in the mainstream -  rather than on the periphery -  of the 
Western philosophy the essence of being human is knowing: 
"Man’s essence is to be a knower of essences".8 You shall not 
know, i.e. you are not allowed to take fruit from the tree of 
knowledge, the Hebraic tradition says, "you shall know" Greeks 
told us in their legacy. “The rest results from this", Nietzsche, 
perhaps the most violent anti-Platonist says in the Anti-Christ (and 
it is perhaps that "rest" that Richard Rorty investigated in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and in his subsequent 
writings). The reduction, or equation, of "humanity" and "knowing" 
gave birth to the priority of epistemological thinking in philosophy, 
for that knowing in question had to be more and more strict, 
methodical, indubitable etc. Two decades ago it was difficult to 
imagine (outside of France, that is) "philosophy" that would not be 
dealing with “knowledge", to imagine philosophy deprived of its 
epistemological hard-core. Platonists, Kantians and positivists 
share a belief that "man has an essence -  namely, to discover 
essence", as Rorty puts it. So, what is at stake in anti-Platonism 
of the author of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in a narrow 
sense d iscussed  here is not on ly the re jec tion  of 
epistemologically-oriented philosophy -  and of a superior place of 
the philosopher in culture associated with it for the good and for 
the bad -  it is also, perhaps first of all, the rejection of a classical, 
Platonic picture of man. Not so much the Platonic picture of human 
nature -  but rather the very conception that there is something that 
might constitute that nature. In the problematic that interests us 
here9, Rorty follows two roads and faces two tasks: the conception
7 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 366 -  emphasis mine.
8 Ibidem, p. 367.
9 For the context of Rorty’s discussions in PMN is much wider: generally 
speaking, he blows a strike at the philosophical tradition of Plato, Descartes and 
Kant, that is, at the same time, at Plato’s conception of truth, knowledge and 
rationality, Descartes’ account of mind as an internal "mirror" and, finally, Kant’s
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of human nature and the epistemologically-centered philosophy. 
Both tasks are interrelated, both conceptions can fall down owing 
to the same blows...
One of them is to distinguish systematic and edifying 
philosophers in the history of philosophy. The former are 
"constructive", engaged in epistemological issues, the latter are 
"reactive", taking as their point of departure "suspicion about the 
pretensions of epistemology". The former present arguments. The 
latter -  satires, parodies and aphorisms, producing transitory 
works (merely reacting...), they are peripheral in their intentions, 
often abandoning their earlierfoundational and systemic ambitions 
-  like Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey, they are skeptical, 
working out their writings for their own generations rather than for 
eternity.* 10 They want to get rid of ocular, especially "mirror", 
metaphors from their philosophizing. They are not willing to accept 
speech as merely representation, sentences are supposed to be 
linked to other sentences rather than (exclusively) to the world (by 
the relation of correspondence). Additionally, they do not want to 
express their views with respect to some questions -  so far 
obligatory and necessary for every professional philosopher -  as 
they seem insignificant to them.
How come they avoid the paradox of self-reference, it could be 
asked? For instance, when they say "man has no essence, no 
nature" or when they say "truth is ..." or "the essence of philosophy 
is..."? They avoid it for they do not put forward the "theory of truth", 
nor do they discover some objective being of "philosophy", nor do 
they present a belief about non-existence of human nature as a 
recently discovered and the only adequate representation of 
reality. The traditional game of discovering how it is really, what is 
objective and what is more and more accurately presented in the 
"mirror of nature" i.e. in the mind, is of no interest to them! 
(obviously, I am summarizing in my own words complexities of 
many pages of detailed Rortyan considerations). Rorty opposes
account of the role of philosophy as investigation and grounding of 
"foundations" of science, morality, knowledge and art. For the needs of the 
present chapter, we just take a tiny fragment of the context in which the book is 
immersed.
10 See Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 366, pp. 365-372.
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the Platonic view of philosophy, the equation of humanity, 
rationality, knowing, inqu iry-to  conversation {and several years 
la te r -  recontextualization), when he w rites of ed ify ing 
philosophers that they
do not think that when we say something we must 
necessarily be expressing a view about a subject. We 
might just be saying something -  participating in a 
conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry. 
Perhaps saying things is not always saying how things 
are.11
Edifying philosophers are thus such "conversational partners" 
who, to use Rorty’s memorable phrase, "prevent conversation 
from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of views".1 2 
Edifying philosophers do not seek for objective truth but protest 
against attempts to finish conversation that might lead to -  and 
here is an ethical motivation -  "freezing-over of culture" and the 
"dehumanization of human beings".13 They protest against claims 
that man is able to know himself in an atemporal and ahistorical 
manner, that he can get to know his nature rather than get to know 
himself by means of certain vocabularies and descriptions. 
Edifying philosophers are the later Wittgenstein and the later 
Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche; systematic philosophers are 
Husserl, Russell, Descartes, Kant and Plato.14
That is an introductory outline of an anti-Platonic theme in 
Rorty’s (anti)-epistemological discussions. It is not accidentally 
and comes as no surprise that the result of a detailed construction 
(destruction) from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature with respect 
to epistemology found its continuation -  after developing the 
m etaphysical trad ition  in "the P lato-Kant canon" from 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity- after a dozen or so years in
11 Ibidem, p. 371 -  emphasis mine.
12 Ibidem, p. 372.
13 Ibidem, p. 377.
14 Although in PMN Rorty still hesitates as to the place of Plato in that 
dichotomy, then later he has no doubts about it. See "Human Rights, Rationality, 
and Sentimentality" in: Human Rights, ed. S. Hurley & S. Shote, New York: Basic 
Books, 1993.
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ethical deliberations. Here the perspective is different: it is not only 
so that epistemology as a core of philosophy is "uninteresting", 
culturally "insignificant" or merely "useless" for social issues and 
we can therefore abandon its questions -  following the lead of 
those greatest edifying philosophers of the twentieth century, 
abandoning the chance of getting answers to classical questions; 
the point is, rather, that now Rorty shows us how the conception 
of rational man derived from Plato leads directly to the most 
serious ethical problems. It is from there that comes Rorty’s -  still 
playful, still within rhetorics, still with the cover of two sides of irony 
-  opposition of reason and sentimentality. To be sure, the ideas 
presented in "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality" do 
not form any clear-cut theory, nor a conception. These are, I 
suppose, first attempts at showing ways of thinking that remain 
opposite to Plato and (almost) whole philosophical tradition, clearly 
appearing also in discussions about the role of the novel in 
sensitizing us to pain and humiliation (that is, to everything that 
matters to the liberal in Rorty’s account). But that is the issue 
deserving a separate section.
2.
Let us note first that the possibility of ethical consequences of 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was not exposed by 
Anglo-Saxon commentators (unless in the direction of nihilism, 
skepticism or relativism) from Reading Rorty, the most important 
collective critical reader devoted to that book. Perhaps it was only 
Charles Taylor who saw such a possibility but not in the text from 
that volume15 but in a later contribution to After Philosophy. End 
or Transformation? He says there that the epistemological 
tradition is strictly linked to the moral and spiritual one, and at stake 
in struggles "over the corpse of epistemology are some of the most 
important spiritual issues of our time".16 That it is the case one can
15 Charles Taylor, ''Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition" in: Reading Rorty. 
Critical Responses to ’Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ (and Beyond), 
A. Malachowski (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 257-278.
16 Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology" in: After Philosophy. End or 
Transformation?, K. Baynes et al (eds.), Massachusetts: MIT Press 1991, pp. 
464-488; p.485.
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see from consequences drawn by Rorty after some time. Here the 
judgement of Plato appears in its full light.
The text "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality", as 
the majority of Rorty’s essays, is occasional and born out of 
contingent circumstances, but, as usual, serves the purpose of 
p resen ting  the m ost im portan t ques tions  of R o rty ’s 
post-Philosophical discourse17. At stake is Bosnia at war; at stake 
are Plato, Aquinas and Kant. And finally reason and feelings or 
sentiments. But we in the present chapter will only be dealing with 
a gloomy picture of Plato.
While in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature there appeared 
Rorty’s serious doubts concerning the human nature -  the protest 
against thinking that we possess "a deep, hidden, metaphysically 
significant nature which makes us ’irreducibly’ different from 
inkwells or atoms"18 -  the ethical significance of that question was 
to be more fully thought over later on. Rorty developed his 
conception of "contingency of selfhood" -  apart from contingency 
of language and contingency of community -  e.g. in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity. What would be human self? -  according to 
Rorty’s well-known phrase, it is a "centerless web of beliefs and 
desires" or a "coherent and plausible set of beliefs and desires".19 
In Rorty’s view such an account of the self was enabled only with 
Freud -  it was only him who rejected the idea of a paradigmatic 
human being, and thereby the very need of a theory of human 
nature.20 The Nietzschean superman is not more "human”, nor is 
so the Kantian dutiful fulfiller of common moral obligations, nor is 
so Harold Bloom’s self-creating "strong poet". Freud was to 
discredit the idea of true human self, and thereby the idea of the 
search for a permanent and unchangeable self behind ever 
changing accidents. As Rorty puts it: Freud helped us "to see 
ourselves as centerless, as random assemblages of contingent 
and idiosyncratic needs rather than as more or less adequate 
exemplifications of a common human essence".21 Rorty saw 
today a growing willingness to disregard the question of our nature
17 For the philosophy/Philosophy distinction, see "Introduction" to CP.
18 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 373.
19 Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection" in PP 2, p. 147.
20 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 35.
21 Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection", p.155.
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and replace it with the following one: "What can we make of 
ourselves?"22 With Darwin and Freud, the sense of our malleability 
was closer and closer to us. Rorty says: "We are coming to think 
of ourselves as the flexible, protean, self-shaping, animal rather 
than as the rational animal or the cruel animal".23 24That is to say, 
we are not content either with Plato’s answer, or with Nietzsche’s, 
the very controversy between them becomes insignificant. What 
was supposed to be specifically human and to "ground" morality 
was (traditionally, since Plato) "rationality". To be human was to 
be rational, and to be rational, at the same time, was to be moral.
Rorty (as a pragmatist) asks about effectiveness of such 
thinking in the context of attempts of bringing about utopias 
sketched by European Enlightenment. According to him in the last 
two hundred years most of the work of changing our moral 
intuitions, vast part of transformations of our "vocabulary of moral 
deliberation was done not by increasing our moral knowledge 
but by -  as he calls it -  "manipulating our feelings“.25 From a 
pragmatic point of view, there appears here a fundamental 
opposition between rationality and sentimentality, reason and 
feelings. Plato, Aquinas, and Kant, claiming their rights to 
knowledge of human nature, had failed; hence the following 
Rorty’s conclusion: "since no useful work seems to be done by 
insisting on a purportedly ahistorical human nature, there probably 
is no such nature, or at least nothing in that nature that is relevant 
to our moral choices” 26 His doubts, as can be seen, are about the 
efficacy rather than epistemic status of moral considerations.
Rorty contrasts rationality and moral knowledge with 
"sentimental education" (which, incidentally, refers us back via 
Flaubert to novelists contrasted with philosophers). The education 
in question takes its power from a well-documented belief that 
today’s Western culture has been shaped by "hearing sad and 
sentimental stories"27 rather than by moral knowledge. What
22 Richard Rorty, "Human Rights...", p. 115.
23 Richard Rorty, "Human Rights...", p. 115.
24 See "Freud and Moral Reflection" in PP 2.
25 Richard Rorty, "Human Rights...", p. 118 -  emphasis mine.
26 Ibidem, p. 119.
27 Ibidem, p. 118. That is to say, for instance, reading novels. See "Brigands 
et Intellectuels", Critique 493-494, Juin-Juillet 1988.
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would be that Plato’s fault, repeated later on by generations of 
moral philosophers, I have been looking for here? Plato according 
to Rorty was to turn the interest of philosophy to extreme cases 
(like Thrasymachus and Callicles), seeing his task in answering 
such questions as, for instance, "Why should I be moral?”, "Why 
is it rational to be moral?", why being moral is in the interest of 
human beings? He tried to convince egoists, neglecting in Rorty’s 
liberal (referring to "pain" and "humiliation") view a much more 
common case: that of a person indifferent to the suffering of others, 
and, whose relation to others is, at the same time, morally 
impeccable. So Plato was supposed to make a turn towards 
rationality to fight with extreme, rare cases instead of trying to 
sensitize us to common suffering of others, often pseudo-humans 
to us (unfaithful dogs during the Crusades, slaves, Blacks etc.). 
The main point of accusation of Plato is exactly the following:
By insisting that he could reeducate people who had 
matured without acquiring appropriate moral sentiments 
by invoking a higher power than sentiment, the power of 
reason, Plato got moral philosophy off on the wrong 
foo t28
Obviously, let us say it right now, we are dealing here with a 
narrative strategy -  Plato, to be sure, could not behave in a 
different manner in the situation of the common birth of logos and 
polis, rationality and socialization, reason, to be sure, was the 
greatest achievement of Ancient Greece, and it is only from current 
perspective that we are able to look at Plato considering possible 
priority of sentiments to reason in shaping liberal consciousness 
in recent two centuries. Within that strategy, one can find the 
source of that denigration of sentimentality, locate in the history of 
philosophy and at the beginning of the narrative about sentiments 
and reason. One also has to bear in mind that it is one of many 
narratives about Plato, the aim of which is making us sensitive to 
dangers deriving from reason itself. And it was to that particular
28 Ibidem, p. 123 -  emphasis mine.
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persuasive story that the very founder of the philosophical 
discourse was useful.
For discussions of Plato are to lead us directly to discussions 
of the present. Rorty binds the two with a violent summing-up when 
he says that our problem is not the (Platonic) rational egoist: "The 
problem is the gallant and honorable Serb who sees Muslims as 
circumcised dogs".29 30And today, after the experiences of the 
Holocaust and other nightmares of the twentieth century coming 
to an end, to be effective, it is not enough to refer to what is 
common to people -  to rationality. And neither Jefferson writing 
about inalienable human rights ever thought about his own slaves 
(a classical example of Rorty’s from his numerous texts), nor the
o n
Nazis thought of the Jews they murdered as fully human , nor 
the sides of the Balkan war saw one another as human beings. 
For what really matters, as Rorty says, is who we think of as 
fellow-human. The history teaches us that Platonic-Kantian 
dreams of common, rational human nature are not efficient enough 
to stop a conviction common out of our (subtle, civilized, and 
post-Enlightenment) cultural sphere that to belong to common 
biological species does not suffice to belong to a common moral 
community.31
It is just that aforementioned sentimental education, 
development of sentiments rather than merely reason, that is to 
bring closer and familiarize people with others so that they were 
not treated as non-human. "The goal of this manipulation of 
sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms ’our kind of 
people’ and ’people like us’". So there is no point in writing of
29 Ibidem, p. 124.
30 See Zygmunt Bauman’s remarks on "racial hygiene" in his Modernity and 
the Holocaust, Oxford: Polity Press, 1989 and Modernity and Ambivalence, 
Oxford: Polity Press, 1992.
31 Let us note that Rorty’s thinking breaks with "humanism" in Heidegger’s 
sense of the term: each humanism (metaphysically) assumed the "essence" of 
man -  man was precisely animal rationale (see the "Letter on ’Humanism’") . 
Rorty is antimetaphysical, anti-Platonic, antihumanistic. He also breaks with an 
"antropologistic" (as Derrida calls it in "The Ends of Man") reading of Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger, popularized in France owing to Kojeve and Sartre. It 
comes perhaps as no surprise that the Derridean tradition of the "Western 
metaphysics" is parallel to Rorty’s "Plato-Kant canon".
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some Rorty’s "irrationalism" (and in criticizing him on principle), for
that is merely intraphilosophical label that allows to keep in order
the ranks of philosophers, the label coming directly from Plato. To
be just in the evaluation of the idea of contrasting reason and
sentiments, one has to look at efficacy of such tactic. And let us
state that this is the tactic successfully used in a different domain
of culture since last century -  in literature. It is there that instead
of formulating general schemes of human duties, developing
abstract theories of morality etc. etc., the writer appeals to the very
same people by metaphors, pictures, smuggles humanitarianism
by means of tears and laughter. What is worth considering here is
the whole pleiade of great writers of recent one hundred and fifty
years... And one can get the impression that Rorty the pragmatist
had been moved by the awareness of real successes of the novel
and novelists on the one hand, and sterility of cultural efforts of
traditional, "Kantian" philosophers on the other. Therefore he is no
longer willing to ask following Plato, Kant and others the question
"Who is man?" and "What is his nature?" -  but, for instance, "What
33sort of world can we prepare for our great-grandchildren?".
If we can create ourselves and shape the surrounding -  after 
Darwin and Freud -  we are no longer obliged to play the game of 
theories of what we really are. Instead of looking for answers to 
the standard question of the (Platonic) rational egoist -  why he 
should be moral -  perhaps one could think of a more important 
question -  "Why should I care about a stranger, a person who is 
no kin to me, a person whose habits I find disgusting?"32 4 Coming 
to an end of that section, one could say the following: if we want 
to realize our dreams and prophecies (e.g. the Enlightenment 
utopia), we will not be helped by classical discussions of human 
nature, the essence of justice (the famous theme of opposing 
Aristotle to Plato in Lyotard’s discussion of justice35) or moral 
obligations of man as man. What is Rorty’s advice? He sees a 
hope in educating generations of tolerant, rich, safe and respectful
32 Richard Rorty, "Human Rights...", p. 123.
33 Ibidem, p. 122.
34 Ibidem, p. 133.
35 Jean-François Lyotard, Just Gaming (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985).
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students in all corners of the world. Perhaps one more point is 
important here: Rorty’s questions presented above may be a 
beginning of a "new reading" of Plato, but they cannot be a new 
"discovery" of Plato or a new "truth" about him (as that of Karl R. 
Popper - Plato is totalitarian!). It is rather, as I can see it, the method 
of engaging the present in philosophy, looking contemporariness 
or outmodedness of old thoughts, it is a "recontextualization" that 
needs for a given problem a dark and a fair side, positive and 
negative protagonists, heroes and villains. Also -  not to be a 
boring, dull, empty story... For the point is not being fundamental, 
but being effective... Even if these discussions are not accepted 
in their entirety in a common philosophical discourse, they are 
nevertheless extremely fertile and stimulating for culture, even if 
one will have to wait until culture redefines in common 
consciousness what philosophy, at our moment and in our culture, 
is.
3.
Who could have helped Rorty in realization of the significance 
of anti-Platonism? It is often repeated that the constitutive element 
of American thought is its pluralism. But pluralism, the multitude 
of perspectives and points of view ("perspectivism") is at the same 
time one of the fundamental descriptions of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, especially in the way it was read by the French 
humanities since the sixties, mainly owing to Gilíes Deleuze. His 
book Nietzsche et la philosophle (1962) shows that Nietzsche is 
simply incomprehensible if "fundamental pluralism of his 
philosophy" is not taken into account"36 Pluralism is for both of 
them a guarantee of a concrete mind -  as Deleuze puts it: "Gods 
died but they died of laughter hearing that some God said there 
was just one God". If each thing has many meanings -  then 
Nietzsche questions in Deleuze’s reading the distinction between 
a model and its copy, the reality and its appearances, that has 
been born with Greek rationality and permeated the culture for 
over twenty centuries. His deep anti-Platonism, an attempt to
36 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, a Polish translation by 
B. Banasiak as Nietzsche ¡filozofia, Warsaw: Spacja 1992, p. 8.
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question the whole building of Western metaphysics, by means of 
its "untimely" influences on (mainly French) postmodern thought, 
shows how to break with writing footnotes to Plato: that method 
may be, for instance, the multitude of perspectives that manifests 
itself in the multitude of stories told (with the famous one about the 
"true world" and the "fable" from The Twilight of Idols) and the aim 
may be that hidden pluralism. (At the same time, one has to bear 
in mind that Nietzsche’s work in that reading is equally 
anti-Hegelian and anti-dialectical).
The anti-essentialism of Rorty’s thought -  an objection to all, 
especially contemporary attempts to look for the hidden "reality" 
under a layer of "appearances", to look for anything deeper and 
more important than the contingent reality of here and now -  may 
also take its roots from e.g. Nietzsche’s philosophy. For 
essentialism in his account is just asking metaphysical questions 
and looking for metaphysical answers about: the essence of truth, 
beauty, justice etc., that is to say, questions beginning with "what 
is...?" And like Deleuze remarks how "Nietzsche seems to be close 
to Callicles and Callicles supplemented by Nietzsche"37, we would 
like to note how Nietzsche in the narrow sense of objecting to 
Platonic foundations of our philosophical thinking is close to Rorty. 
(On the other hand, one has to admit, Nietzsche is never a fully 
positive protagonist for he lacks that liberal component of 
sensitivity, the question about pain of others closely looked with 
the hope that the pain in question can be avoided. His relation with 
Michel Foucault is similar, to some extent- although he wrote thick 
volumes about suffering and humiliation, he lacked hope for the 
better future which today, incidentally, is one of the main aims of 
attacks directed to his philosophy).
"What is truth? -  Nietzsche asks in "On Truth and Lies in an 
Ultramoral Sense" -  a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
antropomorphisms..." And that description suits Rorty’s 
anti-essentialistic convictions, one often finds that definition of 
truth in Rorty’s writings. Just like the Deleuzian belief that what is 
at stake in criticism is not justification but feeling otherwise -  "other 
sensitivity"38 goes hand in hand with Rorty’s conception of
37 Gilles Deleuze, ibidem, p. 64.
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rhetorical and persuasive philosophy which role is to make us 
sensitive to others’ pain rather than produce sophisticated and 
abstract, and insignificant for culture, speculative systems. To 
summarize that theme, let us say that anti-Platonism in 
neopragmatic thought can be derived directly from, for instance, 
peculiarly reinterpreted Nietzsche’s thought.
4.
We shall be dea ling  now w ith the p o ss ib ility  and 
meaningfulness of polemic with such a reading of Plato, passing 
then on to a picture of Greece sketched by Pierre Hadot and 
Giorgio Colli which is more appealing to us. Then we shall pass 
on to more general remarks about readings in philosophy. Their 
Plato will appear here as an alternative vision, an equally justified 
account. Instead of engaging in polemic with details of Rorty’s 
reading, we shall try to show very briefly two other readings, for 
various reasons still more in tune with postmodern thinking in order 
to, as a matter of fact, show the variety of perspectives and 
multitude of attitudes and viewpoints. That will be an implicit way 
of saying: if one can write like Hadot and Colli, eminent French 
and Italian historians of philosophy, respectively, why 
postmodernists should not be allowed to use the Ancient Greece 
for relatively less controversial readings, which is the case with 
Richard Rorty?
The question I am putting here is thus whether one should 
engage in defence of particular, individual readings of Plato’s work 
-  or perhaps in defence of the right granted by postmodern culture 
(but not only of that one -  as we shall see in a moment) to produce 
radically new readings of past philosophy. The first task is 
hopeless, for how is one to compare with philosophical authorities 
who spent years and years in reading Plato and his subsequent 
interpretations. The other task is somehow metaphilosophical. 
That is an open question that is faced not only by readers of Plato, 
but by readers of any other philosophers as well. That is a universal 
question about the right to particularity within the philosophical 
discourse, and let us remember that perhaps -  to make a
38 Ibidem, p. 100.
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metaphoric use of Hegel’s ideas -  his "cunning of reason" will 
make the general shine through the particular, that is to say, an 
obsessively new reading in a longer perspective will contribute to 
a new widely-shared view of Plato, and any other philosopher, 
writer or artist. (Let us remind here of Rorty’s original Nabokov, 
Derrida’s protagonists, the Hegel as is read by Taylor and 
Pelczynski, let us look at the Lyotardian Diderot, "Western" 
Bachtin, the renaissance of the Kantian -  almost forgotten -  
aesthetic of the sublime redescribed by Lyotard in recent years. 
Let us also compare, by way of an example, the Kafka of Bataille’s 
Literature and Evil, of Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka. Pour une 
littérature mineure, Derrida’s "Devant la loi/Before the Law", 
Bauman’s book on modernity and ambivalence, to stick just to 
several readings by philosophers. And what about psychoanalytic, 
feminist, structuralist or reader-response criticism? And so on and 
so forth. The possibilities are practically almost inexhaustible. One 
can ask whether the same "methods" cannot be applied to Plato 
the philosopher? And then Rorty’s reading of him will turn out as 
a relatively most philosophical in a traditional manner...)
Let us pass on to details, though. From the point of view of the 
rhetorical strategy used by Rorty, from that of the persuasive 
rather than argumentative nature of his philosophizing, everything 
is all right as long as he is pragmatically effective. His rhetoric 
needs narrativity, telling stories set in philosophy and narratives, 
as is well known, require good and bad characters.39 40Rorty, 
especially in the period following Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, changed his style of philosophizing the moment he turned 
to a wider public. He became less dialectical and analytical and 
more narrative; as he put it once: "We cannot get along without 
heroes.... We need to tell ourselves detailed stories of the mighty 
dead in order to make our hopes of surpassing them concrete”.4 
As David Hall says in his excellent book, Rorty engages in
39 Perhaps the first to write about it was Charles Taylor in the aforementioned 
text from the Reading Rorty reader, it is also the idea of David L. Hall from the 
book entitled Richard Rorty. Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1994).
40 Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres", in 
Philosophy and History, ed. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge, MA: CUP, 1984), 
p. 73.
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"allegorization of history" -  heroes become names of certain 
virtues and vices -  and he makes metaphysical "lists" of his heroes 
and villains, prior to narratives themselves.41 42And it is on such a 
list that Plato appears and such a role as described in the 
preceding sections is ascribed to him.
Let us return for a moment to Ancient historians. According to 
Giorgio Colli for Plato as we know him (and hence for the Plato 
that has influenced Western thought) everything he wrote" was not 
something serious". That conviction fundamental for us here 
comes from an analysis of a myth about invention of letters by an 
Egyptian god Teut from Faidros and from the passage of The 
Seventh Letter devoted to writing. According to Colli, Plato’s view 
of his own works may be ironic and distancing. And in such a case 
all "footnotes to Plato", taken so seriously, may turn out to be 
footnotes to just one, serious pole of Plato, omitting his non-serious 
pole. And irony derives from the tension between two poles taken 
into account at the same time. Obviously, such a Plato could never 
be presented as a "foundational" and "systemic" philosopher in 
Rorty's sense of the terms. Plato could be defended against such 
criticism in the same way Rorty defends himself -  responding to 
criticism with the other side of irony (the serious one when attacked 
on non-serious grounds, or the non-serious one when attacked on 
serious grounds).
Such a picture of Plato is still more difficult to be acceptable if 
we view ancient Greece following Pierre Hadot (whose influence 
on the late Michel Foucault was very strong), the French historian 
of philosophy who accounts for ancient philosophy as the "spiritual 
exercise". Key words dominating his analysis are, for instance, 
"self-improvement", "self-realization", "self-modification", 
"therapy", "healing one’s soul", "transformation of one’s 
personality", and "conversion”. Ancient philosophy viewed from 
the perspective of the spiritual exercises in question appears not 
as a theoretical construction but as a method of shaping one’s own 
life and one’s own vision of the world, as an attempt to transform
41 David Hall, pp. 59, 60.
42 Giorgio Colli, The Birth of Philosophy, a Polish translation by 
S. Kasprzysiak (Warsaw: Res Publica, 1991), pp. 98-99.
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one’s personality 43 That is, in a word, ancient philosophy is 
conversion, that changes whole life of the one who undergoes it. 
Philosophy became abstract, theoretical procedure no sooner 
than in the Middle Ages when spiritual exercises became part of 
mysticism and philosophy became a conceptual maid of theology. 
And although in modern times it regained its autonomy, it took 
place together with the whole theoretical luggage and it was only 
Nietzsche, Bergson, existentialists who made it once again a way 
of life.44 Then -  to finish that narrative -  after structuralist attempts 
that trend, let us add, gained some response in postmodern 
thought. And although Rorty never says that, in his discussions of 
self-creation he could find significant and powerful allies among 
Ancient Greeks (of which Foucault with his "aesthetics of 
existence" and "life as a work of art” was fully aware45). Reading 
Plato in such an unambiguous way -  the way presented in this 
chapter -  Rorty deprives himself of the possibility of allying with 
Greeks. But let us stress that his texts are smaller or greater 
pragmatic narratives in which parts do not function in the same 
way as they do out of the whole, which have local aims and local 
priorities.
One could ask about the purpose of my writing these brief 
remarks on Hadot and Colli. The answer is simple - 1 am opposing 
Rorty’s American story with different (Italian, French) stories on 
the basis of the assumption that it is no use to criticize its explicit 
details or implicit assumptions. It may be the case that one story
43 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Spiritual Exercise, a Polish translation by 
P. Domański (Warsaw: IFIS PAN, 1992). Hadot remarks that "the aim of all 
philosophical schools [of Ancient Greece] is self-improvement, self-realization. 
... The parallel between physical and spiritual exercises can be guessed here: 
just like repeating physical exercises the athlete provides his body with a new 
shape and power, by the same spiritual exercises the philosopher develops 
powers of his soul, changes internal climate, transforms his vision of the world 
and, finally, his being", p. 45.
44 Pierre Hadot, p. 54.
45 See e.g. "An Aesthetics of Existence" in: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, New 
York: Routledge, 1990; "Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?", Magazine littéraire, No 
309, Avril 1993, pp. 63-73 (in a series of inédits) or "On the Genealogy of Ethics: 
An Overview of Work in Progress", in: The Foucault Reader (ed. P. Rabinów), 
New York: Pantheon, pp. 340-372.
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can only be opposed with another story, one philosophical 
narrative with another philosophical narrative, the one more 
useful, persuasive, different. More useful on an individual or social 
grounds (perhaps it was the reason for inability to counter-balance 
so convincing, so persuasive Popper’s story of Plato?). With ironist 
methodology, criticism in a traditional sense of the term does not 
exist for one has to accept tentatively rules of the criticized. And it 
was Rorty whofavoured "changing the subject ratherthan granting 
the objector his choice of weapons and terrain by meeting his 
criticisms head-on"46 A direct struggle with the ironist is not 
possible. Two sides of his irony will always allow him to save his 
face: so perhaps it is better to "change the terrain" right at the 
beginning and show a glimpse of extremely useful account of 
ancient thought. It is neither the time nor the place to provide 
broader remarks, for these are not what is essential here, we just 
intend to show the possibility of a potential method of criticism of 
Rorty’s account of Plato.
What appears here is a question about differences, if any, 
between "twisting philosophy"47 48and what Harold Bloom labelled 
"strong misreading". How far are we entitled to both in writing 
philosophy and where, possibly, is the boundary, if there is one? 
It is, for sure, a metaphilosophical question; the answer probably 
depends on what we are looking for in philosophy: if we are 
seeking (absolute, non-h istorica l, atemporal and even 
philological) truth, then both attitudes to philosophical texts are out 
of the question. If we are looking for "self-creation" -  to use a key 
word from Rorty’s opposition between solidarity and self-creation 
-  then we merely privatize the philosophical discourse, loyally 
warning the reader about it (stating e.g. that it is "my Plato", "the 
Plato as I can imagine him" in the manner Maurice Blanchot wrote 
"Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him ). But what if we want 
"solidarity", the other part of the pair? It may turn out that also new 
strong misreadings, contributing to topicality of Plato, may be more
46 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 44.
47 My reflections about "twisting (Plato’s) philosophy" were born not without 
stimulating conversations with Piotr Juchacz, and for that impulse I am grateful.
48 See Foucault/Blanchot(New York: Zone Books, 1987).
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revealing for the contemporaries than (seeming) faithfulness to his 
"spirit and letter". How is one to pass a judgement? Perhaps on 
the basis of effects, proposals, interest born or revived, response 
of philosophers from the professional gild (but there are also 
various "untimely" meditations). The questions have been put, we 
are leaving the answers open.
So, thinking of "postmodern" readings of Plato, or of that by 
Rorty in particular, one has to remember about their current 
nature. Also about the fact that they are written by philosophers 
rather than traditional historians of philosophy (to stick to that 
distinction for a moment). The historian of philosophy, let us say, 
stepping now on a very slippery ground, may be looking for 
unambiguous senses of a work (i.e. senses involved with current 
culture only); the philosopher, on the other hand may -  sketching 
his new culture (like Rorty his "liberal ironist", postmetaphysical, 
post-Philosophical etc. etc. one) -  use another (usually past, but 
not only) philosopher for his project, his vision of the future. He 
needs specially prepared past for his projected future, he goes 
back and makes recontextualizations, transforms the surrounding 
of chosen figures from the history of philosophy. He takes a look 
at a closed, written work from a totally different level than the 
historian of literature, to use acute Foucault and Deleuze’s 
metaphor, he takes it as a "toolbox". And that is not a manifestation 
of relativism for certain things cannot be done by a hammer from 
that toolbox. It is similar to the possibility of choice of various views 
given by postmodernism which is not equivalent to relativism by 
any means -  from a pragmatic point of view -  for not every view 
turns out to be an effective tool, not every view can be made use 
of (which, obviously, is determined e.g. by culture).
It is also worth remembering that constructing the history of 
philosophy in a narrative form, as Rorty does it for his own 
purposes, paradoxically enough, requires temporary suspension 
of the irony of the one who is writing it -  for one cannot say that a 
Kant or a Plato is, and at the same from the other side, non-serious 
side of irony, is not, a foundational philosopher. And that 
unavoidable suspension of irony (depriving of the possibility of
49 On the two sides of irony, see David Hall, pp 129-168.
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defence by saying: I said this seriously and that non-seriously, here 
I was a serious philosopher and there a non-serious philosophical 
jester; here -  a philosopher, there -  a poet, etc. etc.) potentially 
forms a crack, opening Rorty’s reading to polemic and criticism.
But one has to remind here of one more thing: Rorty has already 
produced several parallel stories (narratives) of modernity -  in 
Consequences of Pragmatism there are narratives about growing 
"professionalization" of philosophy, about struggles between 
"Kantians" and "Hegelians" and, finally, about a philosophical 
sequence of Kant-Hegel-Nietzsche/pragmatism in a text about 
"nineteenth-century idealism and twentieth-century textualism"50 
So it is hard to assume that what we are writing about here will be 
the only Rorty’s story about Plato. Three parallel narratives about 
modernity from Consequences of Pragmatism are a strong 
example of Rorty’s narrative way of thinking about history -  
therefore one has to avoid being trapped and thinking that this is 
the only, unchangeable and well-founded picture of Plato in 
Rorty’s thinking. Perhaps there will be more pictures of him, as 
necessary links in another, parallel narrative from the history of 
philosophy. For the very evolution of modern thinking itself has so 
far found three accounts in his writings.
Let us ask whether Rorty’s discussions of Plato and on the 
margins of him are non-objective, twisted, essentially insignificant 
(as some historian of ancient philosophy might put it)? I seriously 
doubt it; they come to the problem from various sides, looking at 
it from various angles, each time making use of a different 
perspective -  they somehow approach their object, forming and 
shaping it. That is the method called "perspectivism" in Nietzsche 
and "recontextualization" in Rorty. Let us put forward a question: 
what does it mean that discussions are "false" if there is no truth 
of the text, or that they are "essentially insignificant" if their 
significance can reveal itself after many years? (Quite useful here 
can be Derrida’s considerations of "responsibility" for every 
reading expressed, for instance, in "Toward an Ethic of 
Discussion" from Limited Inc. or in a collection of essays in
50 R. Rorty, in "Professsionalized PhilosophyandTranscendentalistCulture", 
"Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida" and "Nineteenth-Century 
Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism", respectively, from CP.
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literature entitled Acts of Literature5  ̂ -  so there is no "freeplay" as 
Alan Bass mistakenly translated French le jeu in the title of the first 
Derrida’s American essay, which for many years influenced a 
hostile attitude towards him). It is not "free play of intertextuality", 
irresponsible fantasies, that are at stake here -  for an end is put 
by ethics, or rather morality, to refer to Zygmunt Bauman’s 
"morality without ethics" from his superb Life in Fragments. Essays 
in Postmodern Morality.51 2 The choice is individual -  as is 
responsibility.
Discussions about Rorty’s neopragmatic (or, more generally, 
postmodern) reading of Plato opens way to a more serious 
discussion of readings in general, and strong (mis)readings in 
particular. There would appear here (Derridean) questions about 
parasites and hosts, Hillis Miller’s questions from his "Critic as a 
Host", some Paul de Man’s texts as well as a famous book by 
Geoffrey H. Hartman -  Literature/Derrida/Philosophy.53 Finally, 
there would be some place for two conceptions of practising 
philosophy -  a "scientific" and a "poetic" or "literary" one; two 
different readings of Heidegger that gave rise to Derridean and 
Gadamerian branches54, at least two extreme readings of Derrida: 
a radical one a la maniere Christopher Norris et al. and a more 
private and idiosyncratic reading by Rorty based on Derrida’s The 
Post Card etc. etc., without developing that theme here. That is 
the case today, how about yesterday? Let us think of a brutal 
reading by Popper from The Open Society and Its Enemies of 
Plato, Hegel and Marx -  a criticism almost "paranoid" (as Charles 
Taylor, perhaps the greatest authority in Hegelian studies in the 
last two decades, says). And it was -  as Popper put it -  "my
51 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1988), pp. 
111-154, Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. D. Attridge (London: Routledge, 
1992).
52 See Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 10-43.
53 See Geoffrey H. Hartman, Saving the Text. Literature/Derrida/Philosophy 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981).
54 The degree of misunderstanding between the two can be testified by a 
failed book Dialogue & Deconstruction. The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter!New 
York: SUNY Press, 1989), a report of and commentary to the meeting of 
Gadamer and Derrida in Paris in which almost all contributors speak of a 
complete impossibility of a dialogue.
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contribution to the war". There is a question whether it is worth 
while reading such complete misinterpretations, a book written 
with a negative thesis right from the start (although sincere and 
written out of depths of Popper’s heart, late at night, as he reminds 
in his Unended Quest). Let us add that still more than Plato 
deformed -  crushed -  with a New Zealand pen was Hegel, the 
great Hegel of Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit, 
today’s hero of civil society, especially in England. It is a book 
which is published and read, it can be viewed as an extremely 
personal, born out of hard war years, reading of history of 
philosophy. We can say -  incorrect, subjective etc. But let us have 
a look at Russell’s The History of Western Civilization -  it just a 
monster of subjectivity: I like this, I do no like that, is perhaps the 
leading principle of the book...
But these are books read rather than rejected as "false", for 
they provide the reader with an insight to some (exaggerated) 
sides of their protagonists, reveal their unknown (be they only 
potential) faces. They provide us with perspectives born out of the 
time in which they are written, i.e. by culture. Perhaps it is only in 
this context that it is worth while thinking about criticism of, for 
instance, Rorty’s account of Plato. Popper, Russell and many 
others just needed for their own purposes past philosophical 
figures. And that is still the case. There is no moon-like history of 
philosophy, written out of time and out of place, out of culture, sub 
specie aeternitatis; it is possible to defend philosophers against 
twistings and misreadings remembering that it is also defence itself 
that is supported by one perspective, currently chosen -  more or 
less consciously -  by the defender. Readings rejected today can 
be canonical for the next generation. Like the revolution devours 
its own ch ild ren, ph ilosoph ica l readings devour the ir 
predecessors. That is a theme of a violent, (para)Oedipal fight of 
Sons with their Father, of construing one’s place in history by 
means of a radical gesture with respect to others... And like 
Nietzsche struggled with Socrates, that "theoretical man", 
Heidegger with Nietzsche, that "last metaphysician", and Derrida 
with Heidegger, Rorty struggles with Derrida. And that is probably 
the only secure road to immortality... when Jean Baudrillard 
reduces (in the time "after the orgy"- for, as he says in Amérique,
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aujourd’hui, I’orgie est finie) "the future" to "now" and Zygmunt 
Bauman reads the deconstruction of "immortality" as a 
postmodern "life strategy" 55
All these lead us, to be sure, to an ever-present, although 
sometimes in a implicit form, question of the roads of the 
humanities, and of philosophy particularly, today, when old roads 
do not seem fertile at worst and interesting at best... Obviously, on 
can imagine a response that philosophy does not necessarily have 
to be interesting, or read, or culturally stimulating for it has superior 
tasks, from which laymen or all non-philosophers should stay 
clear. Maybe that is the case; but perhaps the case is something 
else. There is no ready answer for which one could reach because 
there is no -  as one is inclined to think in the world of free thought 
-  "truth" of philosophy, no independent being of philosophy, 
pre-existing like Platonic ideas. Philosophy is made by 
philosophers with the help of surrounding culture. And nostalgic 
beliefs in lost unity and unambiguity of it are futile. Maybe it is a 
little bit like in Proust -  it is only in the last volume, Time Recovered, 
that the significance and meaningfulness of seemingly hopeless 
life of Marcel the bon-vivant is revealed, for it is only there that it 
turns out that all the time he was sketching his great work. I hope 
that with a passage of time that will happen to (anti-Platonic) 
postmodernism; the question is, which volume we are stuck in at 
the moment...
55 See Jean Baudrillard, Amérique (Paris: Le livre de poche, 1988), p.105 
and his "After the Orgy" in The Transparency of Evil (London: Verso, 1993), 
Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1992); also Albrecht Wellmer, "The Dialectic of Modernism and 
Postmodernism" in The Persistence of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991).
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